Regime Change in Iran Is Not Off the Table

As of June 24, 2025

Despite the ceasefire, regime change is likely to remain an option for President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, particularly if Iran restarts covertly or not uranium enrichment.  The United States along with Israel should learn from past mistakes on regime change, argue Mat Burrows and Josef Braml.

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The fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December increased speculation about similar events in Iran. Following the U.S. bombing of three Iranian nuclear sites last week, U.S. President Donald Trump raised the possibility of regime change in a social media posting.  A day after he changed his mind and proposed a ceasefire, saying regime change would mean “chaos”. Many of his biggest supporters including his Vice President J D Vance have been strongly opposed to getting in deeper and made the point last Sunday during a TV appearance, saying the United States was not at war with Iran. Some U.S. policy hawks and members of the Iranian diaspora argue, however, that regime change is inevitable; John Bolton, Trump's former National Security Advisor, stated it is time to consider a campaign for regime change in Iran. Yet especially elites and publics in the Middle East can recall previous U.S. regime change efforts in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran itself. These strategic failures should be a warning to stay away from renewed efforts to oust Iran’s leadership.

While the threat of regime change may have receded, U.S. policy hawks argue that having raised the possibility, Trump has added pressure on Iran to hold back on any further strikes against Israel.  Moreover, the knowledge that Trump was seriously considering regime change could motivate the Iranian side to make more concessions in any negotiations on a more permanent peace.  

Ceasefires are notoriously fragile and within hours of Trump announcing it on Monday night both sides appear to have violated it although Trump was more irritated at Israel.  The ceasefire will likely hold in the near term given the strong backing from Trump, the Europeans and likely Russia and China.  There’s still the question whether Iran secretly hid 400kg of highly enriched uranium that some experts believe could easily be upgraded for developing nuclear weapons.  Richard Nephew, Deputy Special Envoy for Iran during the Biden administration believes that despite the extensive bombing and destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities, "the possibility that they have clandestine sites capable of fashioning this material into weapons components is real.”  

If there is mounting U.S. and Israeli intelligence in the next few months that Iran is enriching uranium, then regime change will come back as the only option for ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Already one preliminary U.S. intelligence report says the U.S. bombing only set back the country’s nuclear program by a few months. If Iran’s continued enrichment happens on Trump’s watch and Netanyahu is still in charge in Israel, then the chances that the two will forcibly remove the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Kamenei and try to install a new Israel-U.S. friendly government are high.  Regime change may have receded for now but has not been taken off the table.  

Israel’s Regime Change Playbook

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has for some time expressed support for regime change in Iran and before the recent Israeli attack predicted it could happen soon: It will come a “lot sooner than people think,” he predicted. In a more recent June 2025 video statement, the Israeli Prime Minister directly addressed Iranians, saying: “We do not hate you. You are not our enemies. We have a common enemy: a tyrannical regime that tramples you.” He framed Israel’s military actions as part of a broader struggle for “the triumph of good over evil,” and expressed hope for a future alliance between Israelis and Iranians.  

Netanyahu’s messaging aligns with a long-standing rhetorical strategy used by both Israeli and American leaders: distinguishing between the ruling regime and the general population. The goal is to justify military action while minimizing backlash from international audiences and avoiding escalation with the Iranian public or diaspora in the current conflict.

While the “despots, not people” narrative may resonate with Western audiences and policymakers, it often fails to persuade those in the targeted countries. In fact, it can strengthen hardline factions within the regime, undermine reformist or moderate voices, who are seen as collaborating with foreign agendas. It may lead to a nationalist reaction, reducing the chances of regime change or causing instability in the event of external military involvement. It is an irony of American foreign policy in the region that the failed regime change in Iraq has empowered its arch-enemy Iran.

The Irony of Regime Change History…

The “despots, not people” narrative, a rhetorical strategy, has been employed in multiple U.S. and allied military interventions: In 2003, U.S. officials repeatedly emphasized that the war was against Saddam Hussein’s regime, not the Iraqi people. President George W. Bush stated, “The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.”

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion, justified largely on the premise of regime change and the presence of weapons of mass destruction (which were never found), led to the collapse of state institutions, a power vacuum, and widespread sectarian violence. It cost hundreds of thousands of lives, displaced millions, and destabilized the region for decades. The aftermath—civilian casualties, infrastructure collapse, and long-term instability—undermined that distinction “despots, not people” in the eyes of many Iraqis and global observers.

…and Its Unintended Consequences

One of the most significant geopolitical outcomes was the empowerment of Iran. With Saddam Hussein—Tehran’s fiercest regional rival—removed, Iran expanded its influence across Iraq through political, economic, and military channels, particularly via Shiite militias and political parties. This shift allowed Iran to project power more effectively across the Levant, including into Syria and Lebanon, and to challenge U.S. and Israeli interests more directly.

Iran continues to benefit from regime change history and rhetoric. Iranian leadership has dismissed this framing as disingenuous, pointing to civilian casualties and economic hardship caused by sanctions and military pressure. Regional actors like Hezbollah and the Houthis have used this framing to rally support, portraying Israel and the United States as aggressors regardless of stated intentions. Iranian public opinion, shaped by historical memory, tends to view such rhetoric with skepticism. Many see it as a pretext for foreign domination or regime destabilization.

Iranians’ Historical Memory…

American and Israeli initiatives aimed at regime change in Iran are likely to revive historical memory. Unlike in Western minds, Iran's historical memory still recalls the 1953 coup d'état that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. Orchestrated by the British and American intelligence agencies CIA and MI6 under the codenames “Operation Ajax” (actually: TPAJAX) and “Operation Boot”, the coup reinstalled the Shah and marked the beginning of a long period of authoritarian rule backed by Western powers.

This event is not just a historical footnote in Iran—it is a foundational trauma that continues to shape Iranian perceptions of Western intentions. For many Iranians, especially within the political elite, any talk of regime change evokes memories of foreign interference, betrayal of democratic aspirations, and the imposition of external interests over national sovereignty.

At that time, the nationalization of Iran's oil industry initiated by Mossadegh was reversed and the further exploitation of Iranian oil fields was made possible by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (renamed British Petroleum, BP in 1954 after the conclusion of the consortium agreement) and subsequently also by US oil companies. Washington's new alliance with the Iranian monarchy was to pay off for American exploration companies: They held 40 percent of the shares in the new international oil consortium – the same number as BP.

…as a Backdrop of Today’s Perception

This historical memory plays a crucial role in how Iran interprets current U.S. and Israeli rhetoric or military actions. Even when framed as targeting only the regime or its military apparatus, such initiatives are often seen through the lens of past interventions. This fuels a defensive posture, justifies internal repression under the banner of national security, and strengthens hardline narratives that portray the West as inherently hostile to Iranian independence. Any policy that ignores this historical context risks not only strategic miscalculation but also reinforcing the very regime it seeks to undermine.

Iranians have seen the regime change movie before—and they remember how it ended. Americans should also watch this episode of their history again. The coup d'état came at a high foreign policy price in the long term: without the disempowerment of the democratically elected Mossadegh by the American and British intelligence services, there would have been no Shah regime and, as a result, probably no Islamic revolutionary government, which today violates the human rights of the Iranian population and threatens the security of Israel and the United States.

Remarkably, the history of bilateral relations between the two countries, which is collectively remembered and told in the United States, does not begin in 1953, but only in 1979, with the Iranian revolution. This event changed both domestic and foreign policy of the United States in a serious way.

Events Can Change the Course of History

The Shah's regime, which was protected by the United States and positioned to curb the ambitions of its systemic rival Soviet Union, was swept away in just a few days, surprising the political leadership and intelligence services of the United States. When the Shah left the country on January 16, 1979, and Khomeini returned to Tehran from his exile in France two weeks later, a new foreign policy era began for Washington.

America's foreign policy weakness was also to have a fundamental effect on domestic politics: The re-election of President Jimmy Carter failed not least because of the powerlessness of the world power, which had also become evident in this crisis. The U.S. leadership and people had to watch as revolutionary forces occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, taking 52 diplomats and U.S. citizens hostage for 444 days in order to force the extradition of the Shah, who had found refuge in the U.S. after fleeing via Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas and Mexico. An unsuccessful military liberation operation in April 1980, "Operation Eagle Claw", finally sealed Carter's political fate.

History’s Lesson for Today: It Can Always Be Worse

For the United States, and Israel, destroying Tehran and decapitating the top leadership layers at some time in the future may not produce the regime change they are hoping for. As the Atlantic Council’s Middle East expert Jonathan Panikoff has warned: “history tells us it can always be worse.” Israel and the United States may be able to take out the reigning Supreme Leader but installing a new government that outlasts any initial Israeli or U.S. occupation is highly unlikely.  Instead, an even more hardline one out for revenge would result and Israel could face a continuous and intense conflict, no longer in the shadows.

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