South Sudan: Ever on the brink

It is a commonplace observation that violence in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran has, by dominating headlines, obscured our awareness of atrocities in Burma, Xinjiang, Yemen, the Sahel and particularly in rump Sudan, where the world’s largest humanitarian crisis is unfolding.

But spare a thought for Sudan’s southern neighbour, South Sudan, which broke away in 2011, taking with it a quarter of Sudan’s population, a third of its territory, and most of its oil. South Sudan is the world’s youngest country, and arguably its least developed, though not its poorest, at least on paper. And it is, yet again, on the brink of civil war.

Il n'y a rien qui dure comme le provisoire

After fifteen years of formal independence, South Sudan’s government, its parliament, and even its constitution, remain “provisional.”  Elections have been postponed repeatedly, but the government now seems determined to hold them this December, arguing, plausibly, that it faces a crisis of legitimacy. Many of the conditions that led to past delays, particularly insecurity, continue unabated, but the case could be made that imperfect elections are better than none at all. Authorities, however, have yet to allocate resources to conduct elections, have yet to undertake a census, and have offered no plan to enable voting by the third of the population displaced by fighting.

The decades-long rivalry between the provisional President, Salva Kiir, and the provisional First Vice-President, Riek Machar, has precipitated two civil wars, in 2013-15 and 2016-18, killing hundreds of thousands, displacing millions, and crashing the economy. Machar returned to Juba and re-entered government in 2020, and since then a fraught truce between them persisted. But ethnic violence, which is endemic throughout the country, saw a major recrudescence in the north-east in early 2025, culminating in an attack on the town of Nasir in March 2025 by the Nuer “White Army,” so called because of the white ash the Nuer traditionally daub on their faces for protection from insects and the sun. Although the Nuer are his tribesmen, Machar may or may not have directed the attack. In any case, Kiir took the opportunity to have Machar arrested days later; he is now standing trial, and is blocked from the election. Given that the 2013 conflict was touched off by Kiir moving against Machar, the fact that his arrest has not yet ignited a full-scale conflagration may point to Machar’s diminished standing, but it also casts doubt on the value of elections if a such a prominent contender is excluded.

At 74, Kiir is not old by the standards of international autocrats, but he is ailing and was never comfortable in the political role he has held for over two decades, preferring the army life. He appears increasingly isolated, and in addition to striking at his foes is purging his own inner circle and promoting family members. A succession struggle may already be underway, though Kiir has proven canny at clinging to power; he is driving wedges into Machar’s movement and building alliances, or at least a tacit understanding, with some of the lesser tribes, while asserting the ascendancy of his own Dinka.

Bris of a nation

South Sudan achieved de facto independence in 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended half a century of intermittent civil war with the north and established an autonomous government in the south.  A referendum on secession in 2010 found overwhelming support, but its formal independence in 2011, marked by a grandiose ceremony, is better understood as a rite of passage rather than a new beginning. If South Sudan’s adolescence has been troubled, its infancy was appallingly painful. It was devastated during the early 19th century, when the Royal Navy’s interdiction of the maritime slave trade drove slaving inland, and so subjected what is now South Sudan to raids from the Ottoman-controlled lands to the north. After Britain took control, slavery was suppressed, but the colonial administration was largely indifferent to its new possession, beyond preserving relative stability on the upper Nile. Missionaries planted the seeds of education, but beyond that southern Sudan languished until Sudan as a whole achieved independence in 1955, upon which civil war promptly erupted. The half-century of wars that followed was marked by atrocities perpetrated by northern forces, but also by internecine violence among rival southern factions, particularly those now led by Kiir and Machar. What little infrastructure or industry South Sudan possessed was erased, and the human toll was enormous, with three to four million dead and as many driven from their homes.  

Seldom has a country been more ill-prepared for independence. South Sudan, with a landmass vaster than France, began with 50 kilometres of paved road, few functioning institutions, ministries staffed by de-mobbed guerillas, and today the lowest score of any country in the Human Development Index. Despite its fabulous agricultural and fishing potential, it cannot feed itself, and nearly two thirds of its people depend to some degree on humanitarian assistance, mainly because war has disrupted cultivation. But it does host a young, vigorous, and enterprising population, and it does have oil, one of the factors which drove the civil war with the north. Oil exports are relatively modest, but represent some 90% of government revenue; they are also vulnerable to disruption from within and without, because the pipeline passes through rump Sudan, which is itself convulsed in civil war. A rupture in 2024 nearly emptied government coffers, and left it incapable of paying its bills, including military salaries which risked general mutiny.

A traumatized society

South Sudan has always been a violent place. Its largest tribes – the Nilotic Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk – are cattle cultures, where wealth and worth are measured in herds, and marriage is only possible with a bride-price paid in livestock. Inevitably, a tradition of cattle rustling, and raids on neighbouring villages, accompanied sometimes by performative confrontations, became the norm. Today, however, that tradition has been distorted by the use of AK-47s in place of spears, and become charged with political as well as ethnic overtones. By the 1990s, tribal conflict began to take on genocidal characteristics.

In the past decade, the universal conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary agriculturalists has brought about new upheaval, as the Nilotic tribes thrust southward into the fertile lands of Equatoria, provoking armed resistance in what was hitherto a relatively tranquil region.

The scale of suffering in South Sudan has left its mark on every South Sudanese. The widespread drafting of child soldiers during the liberation struggle, the orphaned “lost boys” wandering the countryside, the pervasive use of rape to terrorise half the population, have scarred generations. Now another generation is being deprived of education, and sometimes the wherewithal of survival. Small wonder that social cohesion is elusive.

Brain drain again

For all that, South Sudanese often evince a surprising sense of common purpose, and to reach beyond ethnic barriers. In the years leading up to independence, and immediately after, thousands returned from the diaspora, bringing skills they acquired in Cairo or Calgary.  They put up with harsh living standards, and systemic corruption, and most saw out five years of war. But now, frustration and fear are driving many away, and the influx of talent is going into reverse, with capable South Sudanese seeking greener – and safer - pastures. This flight of human capital could prove South Sudan’s greatest challenge, and maybe its undoing.

UNMISSed

The United Nations Mission to South Sudan – UNMISS – has neither the mandate nor the strength to enforce peace, but it has been able to dampen conflict, protect civilians, and enable humanitarian access. From the start, it was undermanned and underequipped, notwithstanding the apprehension that the years after independence would be rocky. The UNSC, and the P5 in particular for reasons of their own, knowingly denied UNMISS the resources it needed, but needed to bolster the force after order collapsed. The Council has since whittled UNMISS away, forcing it to close regional bases and cut troop numbers, undermining its ability to fulfil its peacekeeping role, or even to facilitate aid delivery. The Council this week extended the force’s mandate, while further cutting its capacity.

If the world community yet again fails in its responsibility to the people of South Sudan, they will not be the only ones to pay the price. The Horn of Africa, a strategic region of 250 million, could be further destabilised, sending ripples across the globe.

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